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The following article is written as a sympathetic critique of Benjamin Cohen’s recent 
identification in RIPE of incommensurable traditions of American and British IPE.  It 
is also designed to engender further debate within the subject field on this most 
central of issues.  Our argument is that scholars should beware the rigid terms in 
which Cohen identifies IPE’s transatlantic divide, because simply by naming his two 
camps as polar opposites the invitation is open to others to entrench such an 
opposition in their own work.  This would be regrettable enough had IPE already 
lapsed into the geographical division that Cohen describes.  It is made more 
regrettable still by the fact that this is in any case an inaccurate account of the field 
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All at sea in a barbed wire canoe: 
Professor Cohen’s transatlantic voyage in IPE 
 
 
Professor Cohen is a distinguished member of the international political economy 
(IPE) community, however defined.  In his own substantive areas of interest, 
especially his work on money and finance, he has made major and lasting 
contributions to scholarship.  We respect him for it highly (e.g., Watson, 2007).  
Ironically, however, by the criteria he uses to identify the difference between IPE 
scholarship on either side of the Atlantic in his recent RIPE article (issue 14, number 
2), his own is of a kind that would qualify him for honoured and senior membership 
of the IPE community on the other side of ‘the pond’ to which he resides.  At the very 
least, almost anyone who would identify their work in line with his characterisation of 
‘British IPE’ would be quick to try to claim him as one of their own.  Hence his 
implicit assertion from a philosophy of social science perspective of the superiority of 
the IPE scholarship on his side of the pond seems a little odd (Cohen, 2007).  Despite 
what might be seen by other people as the denial of his own professional instincts, 
there is a clear submerged advocacy of ‘American IPE’ to be found in his article, and 
it is this that causes us to suggest that his transatlantic crossings appear to be 
undertaken in the proverbial ‘barbed-wire canoe’.  As we will try to suggest, this is 
not a comfortable way to travel. 
Ultimately, and for the sake of the subject field that we share with Cohen, this 
may not be a bad thing.  The prose that Cohen uses to articulate his vision of a 
transatlantic divide shows its existence to be a cause of regret and not rejoicing.  It is a 
shadow that looms over IPE rather than something that can help the subject field’s 
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practitioners shed light on contemporary developments, large and small, within the 
world economy.  Our objective in this response is to assist Cohen in the task of 
dispelling that shadow.  But we believe that this first entails dismissing his 
characterisation of the subject field.  It can be challenged, we will argue, on the 
grounds that it is in any case a poor representation of the field.  Moreover, it needs to 
be challenged, because if his notion of an immutable divide becomes the accepted 
way of viewing the field then this threatens to leave many of the most insightful 
contemporary IPE theorists stranded in mid-Atlantic with no opportunity of reaching 
either shore.  We wish to prevent the situation in which future discussions of the 
nature of IPE involve deciding whether to despatch lifeboats to rescue those who are 
capable of theoretical innovations which capture the essence of changing 
socioeconomic realities but who remain trapped in the middle of crude 
methodological stereotypes.  To do so we think that it is necessary to confront Cohen 
on the territory of his own argument, for fear that unless this is done he will be one of 
the first in need of such a lifeboat. 
Our response revolves around four core contentions.  (1) We argue that Cohen’s 
position in his RIPE article is internally inconsistent, such that if he genuinely 
believes his own depiction of the field then his appeal for a reconciliation of the 
discordant camps of American and British IPE on some hypothetical middle-ground 
is, to say the least, wishful thinking.  (2) We suggest that this tension might be 
resolved by the fact that his characterisation of a discordant transatlanticism is in any 
case severely limited, being based on excessive caricature rather than being an 
authentic representation of the breadth of argument that one encounters in IPE.  To 
call Cohen’s characterisation a caricature is not to deny that there is some truth in 
what he argues: that, after all, is the nature of successful caricature.  The issue, 
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though, is one of emphasis, particularly as his description of what he also admits is a 
flourishing British variant consists of references to a mere handful of people’s work.  
(3) Caricatures have effects when it comes to delineating the parameters of a subject 
field, and we show that the presentational device embedded in Cohen’s caricature 
serves to naturalise a particular way of doing IPE so as to enforce exactly the sort of 
limits on IPE scholarship that he uses his article to warn against.  (4) We argue that 
the real questions of normative and positive scholarship which are likely to divide 
practitioners of IPE are very different to the ones that Cohen focuses on, and we offer 
an alternative account of what it will mean to be doing IPE in the future which is 
liberated from his notion of a trans-Atlantically derived methodological struggle. 
Our argument proceeds in three stages.  In section one, we unpack and question 
the sociology of knowledge assumptions that pervade Professor Cohen’s ostensible 
identification of a discordant transatlanticism in IPE.  Our objection to his position at 
this point in our argument is one of immanent critique.  In section two, we take this 
objection one step further, showing that Cohen’s characterisation of IPE is encoded 
with a series of assertions about what makes a valid subject field in the first place.  
Whilst his characterisation situates his own work somewhere in mid-Atlantic, his 
conception of what a subject field needs to possess in order to justify its own 
existence actually privileges his American variant of IPE.  In section three, we present 
our alternative account of what we take to be the current state of play within our 
subject field.  With luck, this will convince readers that our objections to Cohen’s 
characterisation amount to more than simply the disgruntled musings of two 
exponents of ‘British’ IPE, which would thereby serve only to confirm his claims 
about the existence of a transatlantic divide.  Instead, our aim is to demonstrate that 
there are more useful ways of cutting into the debate about the future of IPE than 
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thinking in terms of American and British variants at all.  Moreover, these are ways 
that are already fully in evidence within the subject field.  We conclude with some 
comments on the potential dangers of operating with a crude methodological 
caricature of what might divide IPE into two hostile geographical heartlands. 
 
 
1. Where Cohen’s argument does not stand up: Incommensurable meta-
theoretical underpinnings are not reconcilable 
 
In this section we take Cohen’s argument at face value.  Although future sections will 
show that we believe the specifics of his transatlantic divide to be more imagined than 
real, for current purposes we are willing to suspend that judgement to ask about the 
implications that follow if his characterisation of the field is accurate.  We show that 
even by making this temporary concession to the notion of a real divide all is not well 
with Cohen’s argument.  Important consequences ensue from identifying 
fundamentally opposed American and British traditions on the meta-theoretical terms 
he describes, the most significant of which is that the reconciliation he seeks then 
becomes impossible. 
Professor Cohen’s expressed aim is primarily descriptive, and there is substance 
to his core contention that IPE is anything other than a unified field.  One can discern 
different emphases within IPE, for instance, about the need to see economic activity 
as being embedded in political, historical and cultural contexts, and especially in the 
social bonds that developed between the abstractions we traditionally call ‘state’ and 
‘market’ as a response to the extension of the franchise in the twentieth century.  
Some IPE scholars certainly conceive of the economy under advanced capitalism as 
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an autonomous realm with its own internal logic, asking only about how the 
prevailing pattern of regulation developed in order to impose management on that 
realm.  Others conceive instead of regulatory systems as fundamentally constitutive 
elements of any economic experience, thereby shying away from the use of 
interpretive techniques predicated on the assumption that the economy is a self-
sustaining entity. 
Such differences in emphasis go right to the heart of reflections about what it 
means to be engaged in IPE, so to wish them away would be to do a disservice to the 
eclectic nature of the field.  Even the fact that Cohen is incorrect in asserting that his 
two camps of American and British IPE usually fail to talk to one another may not 
necessarily be something to bemoan in itself.  Despite being an exaggeration – or 
perhaps because it is an exaggeration – it serves to concentrate other people’s minds 
on what the subject field stands to gain from even more direct engagement amongst 
its practitioners and from making eclecticism a virtue.  This is surely something to 
encourage.  In this sense, the positive rhetorical impact of the claim that IPE is 
currently dominated by two geographically determined camps who consistently 
ignore one another means that any potential mischaracterisation of difference 
embedded in claims of this nature is defensible on consequentialist grounds provided 
that it does not inadvertently strengthen that from which it wishes to protect us. 
Our contention is that, unfortunately, this is not something that Cohen’s 
exposition manages to achieve.  His identification of a hostile transatlanticism in IPE 
centres on the assumption that there are two traditions within the subject field, which 
are constructed upon very different notions of both the goals and the methods of 
social scientific research.  Taken literally, two such traditions could not talk to one 
another, because they would have no shared ontological or epistemological elements 
 7 
on which to base a genuine dialogue.  However, it is precisely a dialogue for which 
Cohen calls, and the later pages of his article seem to be grounded in the assumption 
that common meta-theoretical starting points are unnecessary for disciplinary 
dialogue to ensue so long as the practitioners of American and British IPE do more to 
exhibit mutual recognition of the value located in each other’s tradition.  This would 
be a comforting world in which to live, but our reading of meta-theoretical debates 
suggests a different social scientific reality. 
Although we do not accept its validity, we will work for a moment with Cohen’s 
conception of a meta-theoretically divided field with one foot on either side of the 
pond and see where this conception takes us.  We start by noting that 
incommensurable ontological and epistemological positions cannot suddenly be made 
compatible through a process of compromise.  By their very nature, they cannot 
simply inch ever closer to one another as mutual recognition begets a process of give 
and take before eventually producing a common ground of shared practice.  If this is 
the mid-Atlantic position that Cohen has in mind when writing his article then, 
unfortunately, it is completely devoid of anchoring on meta-theoretical terra firma.  
What makes ontological and epistemological positions incommensurable in the first 
place is that there is no common ground on which to unite. 
Ontological considerations are logically prior to those of epistemology (e.g., 
Hay, 2002: 63).  By asking questions of epistemology in IPE we force ourselves to 
confront what we could conceivably know about the structure of economic relations 
internationally (e.g., Murphy and Tooze, 1991a).  However, before we can answer this 
question we must first have a clear idea about what exists within the world for us to 
know.  This is the basic ontological issue of attempting to specify the nature of the 
socioeconomic environment that falls under our investigation.  However, Cohen’s 
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transatlantic divide is rooted in wholly incompatible answers to this most fundamental 
of questions.  Using Brian Fay’s analytical distinction to show what lies beneath 
Cohen’s characterisation, the division he presents equates American IPE with 
‘ontological atomism’ and British IPE with ‘ontological structuralism’ (see Fay, 1996: 
31-2). 
Whichever of its particular roots are followed, Cohen’s American IPE 
understands its basic units of analysis – be they people, firms or, most likely, states – 
as individually formed and capable of identifying, constructing and acting upon their 
own interests on that basis.  When asking the epistemological question of what might 
be known about these interests as a means of explaining how they lead to particular 
patterns of observed outcomes within the world economy, it must first be decided that 
the only thing we might need to know about socioeconomic reality in IPE revolves 
around the relationship between individually formed interests and collectively 
experienced outcomes.  By contrast, whichever of its particular roots are followed, 
Cohen’s British IPE is concerned instead to historicise the conditions of world order 
and to understand how its basic units of analysis – and again this could be people, 
firms or states – derive their economic identities relative to prevailing conditions and 
constitute particular logics of action accordingly.  But when asking the 
epistemological question of what might be known about these identities as a means of 
explaining how they influence particular patterns of causality within the world 
economy, it must first be decided that the only thing we might need to know about 
socioeconomic reality in IPE revolves around the relationship between historically 
produced identities and collectively experienced outcomes. 
Ontological atomism and ontological structuralism differ so completely in 
essence that there is no way of simply moving between the two realms of analysis in 
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order to provide a unified explanation combining the two: to borrow the image of the 
old saying, apples are not oranges and nor can they ever be so.  Both ontological 
atomism and ontological structuralism involve not only a commitment to a particular 
way of viewing the world but also a largely unquestioning acceptance of the 
conceptual apparatus that allows the world to be viewed in such a way.  Cohen’s 
description of fundamentally opposed American and British variants of IPE clearly 
invokes Thomas Kuhn’s notion of competing paradigms of thought (Kuhn, 1977).  
However, Kuhn is adamant that the dynamic which helps us to transcend the 
competition between paradigms is not one of a gradual blurring of the distinction 
between the two so much as the outright victory of one over the other.  This is 
because the theorist does not engage directly with the given external world but with 
what Kuhn calls the ‘phenomenal world’ that the theory itself calls forth (Kuhn, 1970: 
119-20).  The phenomenal world gives a sense of what the external world looks like, 
but it should not be confused with the external world per se. 
Cohen’s notion of two variants of IPE doing battle with one another from their 
entrenched geographical heartlands posits the existence of two entirely separate 
phenomenal worlds which afford no direct access from one to the other.  Taking the 
Kuhnian theme one step further, neither phenomenal world can be inhabited by its 
theorists as if it were an authentic representation of the external world.  The 
phenomenal world is instead a self-perpetuating entity, where understandings of its 
content result from theorists’ increasing familiarity with standard exemplars which are 
designed to affirm that they are correct to view the world in the way that they do.  
Along similar lines, particular practices come to dominate both American and British 
IPE in Cohen’s characterisation, but this is not because they tell us anything definitive 
about the external world of international economic affairs.  Rather, it is because those 
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practices are explicable in their own terms from within the paradigmatic thought 
processes associated with both camps’ prevailing phenomenal world. 
The important point we are making here is that, whilst analytical practices are 
entirely self-explanatory within their own phenomenal world and are what binds 
together the community of scholars who inhabit that world, from Kuhn’s perspective 
they defy explanation from an alternative phenomenal world.  To place this in the 
context of Cohen’s discussion, what assists the reproduction of American IPE and 
therefore does not need to be questioned by its practitioners simultaneously 
undermines the intuitive frames of reference of British IPE and therefore must 
necessarily be a subject of critique.  The same is also true the other way around.  This 
is why Cohen’s call for a meeting of minds between his discordant camps, albeit 
made with the best of intentions, is likely to be self-defeating.  If his depiction of a 
field wracked by incommensurable ontological and epistemological positions is to be 
believed, then where exactly might those minds meet? 
This starts to take us to the heart of the matter, because once we open up 
Cohen’s argument to that question we begin to find that his implied answer is 
considerably more partisan than the use of conciliatory images like a ‘meeting of 
minds’ suggests.  Behind the veil of description that forms the professed intention of 
his piece lie multiple layers of implicit prescription.  His discussion starts with an 
account of what makes a subject field, but this account defines the field 
epistemologically in ways which subsequently get presented as the basis of American 
IPE.  Right from the outset, then, there is a process of ‘othering’ taking place in which 
the epistemological roots of British IPE are constructed outside the boundaries of his 
presentation of what it means to be a valid subject field in the first place. 
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Early in the article (pp. 198-200) American IPE is equated with ‘objective’, 
‘conventional’ social science, with standards of rigour to be admired and to be placed 
alongside other reputable intellectual endeavours.  By extension, and in sharp 
contrast, British IPE is at best ‘less’ conventional and ‘openly normative’, being 
populated by scholars whose first instinct is to indulge an anti-establishment streak 
rather than to conform to true scientific standards.  As we will demonstrate, an 
acceptance of Cohen’s assumptions of what makes a subject field would mean that the 
only possible place the two variants of IPE can meet is on the territory that he has 
already staked out for American IPE.  The sociology of knowledge perspective 
embedded in Cohen’s account is therefore a conspicuous intervention into the debate 
about how to do IPE in its own right.  If this is true, then his subsequent plea for a 
rapprochement between the two camps is unlikely to bear fruit.  Indeed, its 
unintended consequence might well be to unify the field as a much more restricted 
mode of enquiry than is currently the case, moving from two variants to just the one.  
We turn in the next section to investigate the dynamics through which this might 
become so, and it is here that we begin to impose onto our argument our own view 
about how best to characterise the different scholarly emphases that can be detected 
within IPE.  We argue that Cohen’s transatlantic divide is more imagined than real in 
the specific features he describes, but moreover that it is imagined in such a way as to 
facilitate a gravitational pull towards one of its geographical poles. 
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2. Where Cohen’s argument becomes par tisan: An un-level playing field of 
methodological competition where the rules belong to American IPE 
 
Whenever the suggestion of unifying a subject field arises within the social sciences, 
the debate quickly becomes one of the extent to which others should open themselves 
up to the methods of economics by incorporating rational choice theory as the primary 
engine of enquiry.  This is the source of the ‘objective’, ‘conventional’ modes of 
analysis that Cohen attributes to American IPE.  Advocates are in abundance on both 
sides of this question, and this is as true of political science, international relations and 
international political economy as practiced in the United States as it is anywhere else 
in the world.  The image of a unified American IPE based on the cloning of economic 
method is much more evident in Cohen’s characterisation of the subject field than it is 
in practice.  The type of IPE undertaken in the United States is incredibly varied, and 
that variety is replicated in similar form elsewhere.  The sense of a fractured field 
might be as apparent in other practitioners’ minds as it is in Cohen’s, but the 
transatlantic nature of that fracture is almost certainly not its most salient feature. 
For us, the biggest problem with Cohen’s presentation of two internally coherent 
geographical heartlands of IPE dividing the world methodologically is that, by 
aligning this presentation with arguably the prime international relations metaphor of 
inter-state competition, he threatens to reinvent for IPE a systematic struggle over 
methods which has occurred before in other subject fields and which has had 
attendant adverse effects on the subsequent breadth of scholarship.  The field we have 
in mind in this respect is economics, which is particularly relevant given the as yet 
unresolved nature of the relationship between IPE and economics.  By way of 
historical analogy, we would suggest that Cohen’s two camps bear striking 
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resemblance to the protagonists in the Methodenstreit amongst German-speaking 
economists in the late nineteenth century.  This struggle transposed itself across 
borders, eventually impacting upon economics wherever it was practiced, and it 
resulted largely in the eradication of other forms of economic scholarship and the 
emergence of a neoclassical core.  From that time, in one form or another the centre of 
gravity within the economics profession has been skewed decisively towards the 
phenomenal world of neoclassical theory. 
Post-Methodenstreit, as Daniel Hausman (1992: 205-6) has demonstrated, 
refinements in neoclassical methodology have revolved around an ‘inexact deductive 
method’.  This is in turn founded upon ceteris paribus statements concerning 
relationships within economic theory rather than economic practice (i.e., within the 
phenomenal world created by economic theory itself).  Particularly significant in this 
respect are assumptions regarding the meta-theoretical centrality of the individual and 
the ostensible universality of the individual’s behavioural traits.  From Paul 
Samuelson’s Economics (1948) onwards, the books that have served as the key 
pedagogical texts in economics have increasingly systematically removed the 
remaining traces of dissenting scholarship from the accepted canon of the subject field 
(on this, see Thompson, 1999). 
This, at any rate, is how conventional histories of economics remember the 
resolution of the Methodenstreit.  And of course the writing of history itself has 
consequences, with this being never more the case than in the writing of intellectual 
history, where so often it is constructed from the perspective of the victors specifically 
to entrench their sense of having ‘won’ (e.g., Tabb, 1999).  Implicit in Professor 
Cohen’s discussion of the transatlantic divide – at least in his discussion of the need 
for IPE to proceed on the territory already staked out for its American variant if it is to 
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deserve the reputation of being a proper subject field – is a Methodenstreit Mark Two 
judgement that neoclassical economics as method has ‘won’.  At the level of practice 
this might well be so, but at the equally important level of what practice should be the 
picture is altogether more complex. 
There exists important bibliometric evidence to demonstrate that no other social 
scientific practitioners read less extensively outside of their discipline than do 
economists, who appear to take comfort from becoming ever more insular in their 
work within the neoclassical core (e.g., Frey and Eichenberger, 1997).  To import the 
methods of neoclassical economics might therefore also be to import its insularity.  
There are many practitioners of IPE – on both sides of the pond, no less – who would 
not be aggrieved by such a development so long as it could be associated decisively 
with increased rigour.  One important struggle which will shape the future of IPE is 
over the extent to which neoclassical economics should be allowed into the subject 
field, and it is caricature alone that enables this struggle to be re-presented in the form 
of inter-state competition between practitioners from either side of the pond. 
Looking at international political economy from the external perspective of 
economics, Barry Eichengreen has argued (1998: 1012) for the need “to move in the 
direction of formulating parsimonious models and clearly refutable null hypotheses, 
and towards developing empirical techniques that will allow hypotheses to be more 
directly confronted by the data”.  But this should not be understood as the uninvited 
encroachment of neoclassical theorists onto the territory of other subject fields.  By 
the time that Eichengreen was writing, the assertion that a specifically neoclassical 
form of economics should be the preferred model for international political economy 
had already been made by insiders in the IPE profession.  A whole decade before, in 
his now classic defence of deductive-rationalist method and critique of inductive 
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reflexivism, Robert Keohane (1988: 382) insisted on the need to focus full-square on 
“substantive rationality” lest we fall into the trap of “diversionary philosophical 
construction”.  The parallels are clear between Keohane’s argument and the position 
taken by Joseph Schumpeter in his History of Economic Analysis.  Schumpeter wrote 
this book from an avowedly post-Methodenstreit perspective celebrating the cleansing 
of the core of economics of everything but deductive-rationalist method, arguing 
along the way that “the garb of philosophy is removable … in the case of economics” 
(1994 [1954]: 31).  By replicating such an assertion in relation to his own subject 
field, Keohane’s view in effect reduces IPE to the handmaid of the intellectual 
preferences of economics.  Many social scientists have reflected upon the colonising 
instincts expressed by economists, but for the methods of economics to advance into 
other subject fields this type of intellectual imperialism has to be embraced by those 
already inside the field. 
The question remains of what we want our IPE to be.  Cohen’s preference is for 
a clearly defined subject field which can look others (primarily economists) in the eye 
as equals, even if this means conforming to their standards of enquiry as the means of 
doing so.  By contrast, we argue that IPE is better seen as a ‘hosting metaphor’, 
enabling concepts – as opposed to methods – to be brought in from elsewhere as a 
means of understanding the structures and practices of relevance to the world 
economy.  There are at least two aspects to this claim.  First, IPE is bounded by the 
exploration of the relationship between power and wealth.  It cannot therefore be 
modelled on modes of analysis appropriate to studying one in isolation from the other 
(whether that is the study of political, sociological, cultural or religious power on the 
one hand or economic wealth on the other).  Second, it sits at the interface of events 
which naturally straddle the artificial disciplinary boundaries of academic 
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professionalisation.  In this context, we might go as far as to say that the Atlantic 
should more hopefully be seen as a lake that connects than as an ocean that divides. 
We do not wish to over-estimate the current and still limited interaction between 
economics and other social sciences, but a rethink of conventionally embedded 
intellectual separations might already be taking place.  (1) The rise of the self-styled 
‘perestroika’ movement in American political science and the increasing prominence 
of the ‘Post-Autistic Economics’ movement has focused attention on the potential for 
burgeoning internal diversity within the social sciences.  (2) The changes in the world 
economy associated with globalisation and the communications revolution have 
generated a multitude of questions that cannot be addressed simply from within a 
deductive-rationalist paradigm.  The phenomenal world created by neoclassical theory 
is increasingly found wanting when confronted with changes in the real world that it 
cannot explain.  Within the context of an increasingly under-performing phenomenal 
world, it becomes progressively less tenable to present economics as ‘the approach’ to 
explaining social reality rather than as one approach amongst many. 
Modern forms of global political mobilisation influence, destabilise and 
reconstitute economic outcomes to a degree that escapes the abstracted notion of 
causality incorporated into deductive-rationalist neoclassical theory.  The singularity 
of rationality in decision-making is thus both contaminated and constrained.  Indeed, 
the whole practice of ‘politics’ can be seen as the manifestation of an inability to 
reach a rationally determined equilibrium that has all the clinical attributes of the 
neoclassical model.  It is the complexity in the strategic relationships between actors 
and the ensuing fragility of politics in the study of particular historical events that can 
render problematic much rational choice theory and its desire for formalisation.  As a 
consequence, many scholars of IPE who traverse Cohen’s transatlantic camps 
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continue to respect traditional narrative approaches of an inductive nature: what Dahl 
(1962: 101-4) long ago referred to as empirical theory in political science.  They do so 
for three reasons. 
First, empirical theorising allows us to look at both persistence and change in 
values and practices over time.  It is especially an invaluable approach to adopt when 
working at the interface of international and comparative political economy.  
Narrative approaches concentrate on processes and anchor research in historical 
perspective.  The language changes but very often the issues, questions and agendas 
remain directly similar in substance.  Second, an inductive experiential narrative 
approach finds it easier than a deductive-rationalist approach to identify path 
dependence and sequencing.  Third, empirical theory in IPE has assisted the 
reassertion of institutionalist and historicised approaches.  Narrative (and also inter-
textual) methodologies allow us to address broader issues of language and meaning 
and present opportunities to bring these to bear in empirical contexts.  In all of this, 
methodological pluralism appears to be the order of the day. 
Against such a backdrop, it concerns us that Cohen’s conception of 
incommensurable variants of American and British IPE looks capable of 
reinvigorating something akin to the terms of the Methodenstreit, only this time as 
applied to IPE.  We do not suggest that this is Cohen’s explicit intention, and indeed 
there is no evidence to support such a claim.  But the logic of his presentational style 
points in this direction.  Should it become embedded in the minds of its practitioners 
that debates within IPE can only take place across the imagined transatlantic divide – 
which in return reflects what we call ‘IPE as methodological competition’ – almost 
certainly those debates will be cast in terms of the search for a ‘winner’.  The lessons 
that can been drawn from the nineteenth century Methodenstreit in economics are 
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clear: whatever the finer points of the actual history involved, with hindsight it tends 
to be remembered as a struggle over methods which persisted until a decisive 
resolution was reached, at which point only one camp remained and methodological 
homogeneity ensued. 
Cohen’s appeal for a meeting of minds suggests a process of intellectual 
compromise and a generally middling solution to the current transatlantic divide.   
But, for the meta-theoretical reasons already explained, this does not appear to be the 
most likely path for his two camps of IPE to take.  Much more likely is a decisive 
triumph of one camp over the other, with the victor’s ever deeper entrenchment as the 
orthodoxy, the gradual disappearance of the vanquished and the subsequent narrowing 
of the subject field so that it corresponds solely to the intellectual terrain of the victor.  
Moreover, given that Cohen’s depiction of what makes a subject field enforces on IPE 
an approach that replicates his American variant, it does not take much to guess which 
of IPE’s current geographical heartlands is more likely to prevail.  It would be a 
shame if methodological competition were to erase all but one way of doing IPE from 
what was considered acceptable, as a forced retrenchment of the subject field around 
Cohen’s American variant would sideline many of the most important recent 
developments in IPE.  This is the issue to which we now turn, and it allows us to drive 
home our contention that Cohen’s characterisation of a transatlantic divide is 
misplaced as an account of the current state of IPE. 
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3.  Where Cohen gets it wrong: A future for IPE beyond methodological 
competition 
 
IPE is a dynamic rather than a static field of enquiry.  The picture painted by Cohen 
could possibly conform to how practitioners of a previous generation positioned their 
work against the field as a whole, but it is only remotely recognisable today.  A strong 
strand of scholarship in IPE has emerged which: (1) transgresses conventional social 
science boundaries; (2) explicitly rejects the loaded connotation of the ‘rigour’ that 
Cohen espouses because it sees this (in our terms) as unhelpful methodological 
competition; and (3) resists the abstractionism of postmodernism in favour of the 
progressive principle that life might be made better (for an early elaboration see 
Murphy and Tooze, 1991b).  This approach we could call a ‘new political economy’ 
that attempts to combine the breadth of vision of the classical political economists 
from Smith to Marx with the analytical advances of twentieth century scholarship and 
a concern for contemporary conditions of existence around the world (for a flavour, 
see Gamble, 1996; Watson, 2005; and the essays in Higgott and Payne, 2000).  It 
might already be said to constitute the cutting edge of IPE but, worryingly, it does not 
find a place in Cohen’s exposition. 
Driven by a need to address the complex and often enveloping nature of 
different globalising tendencies, the methodology of the new political economy 
rejects the old dichotomies – between agency and structure, between ideas and 
material interests, and between states and markets – which fragmented classical 
political economy into separate disciplines and promoted the methodological 
competition that Cohen’s account serves to sustain.  It also steps away from Cox’s 
(1981) initially useful but now limited and overworked analytical dichotomy between 
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IPE as ‘problem solving’ and IPE as ‘critical theory’.  Instead, the type of scholarship 
we have in mind encourages its practitioners to be as explicit as possible about the 
normative assumptions underpinning their accounts, on the basis that this is the best 
way to allow IPE to act as a ‘hosting metaphor’ capable of facilitating genuine 
political engagement about preferred forms of modern social life.  Analyses of 
international economic affairs then take place across different levels of abstraction in 
order to ensure that such engagement is as deeply grounded in historical, cultural and 
social detail as possible. 
The aspiration is towards a relatively hard-headed, material (dare we say real 
world) political economy that tries to explain how choice is affected by the social 
meanings of objects and actions.  If there is one thing that the emerging processes of 
globalisation teach us, it is that mono-causal explanations of economic phenomena 
lack sufficient powers of persuasion to allow us to understand the world that we are 
creating.  Such a view today holds increasing sway: (1) amongst Third World 
economic nationalists and academic critics of the neo-liberal policy agenda who find 
little comfort in the turn instead to anti-foundationalist theories associated with 
postmodernism; and also (2) arguably more interestingly, amongst sections of the 
mainstream of the economics community who have become increasingly frustrated by 
the abstracted virtualism of contemporary high neoclassical theory (see inter alia, 
Rodrik, 1998; Krugman, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002).  This is a reformist scholarly tradition 
that IPE should embrace and that its practitioners should even seek to lead.  But the 
task of promoting it as IPE’s own can only be undermined by continuing to think of 
the subject field in terms of old-style methodological competition between its 
geographical heartlands, especially as this is not what the field today is about. 
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The reformism inherent in the new political economy reflects a resistance to the 
often overstated virtues of parsimonious theorising for which the current globalising 
era offers little comfort.  It accepts that the analysis of modern conditions of social 
existence must be grounded in history and the material consequences of prevailing 
patterns of accumulation, but it also celebrates a critical policy bent.  Policy narratives 
associated with the new political economy typically encompass a strong normative 
agenda of ‘order’, but this is not an order that is simply a euphemism for the absence 
of open conflict and the presence of control.  Rather, it is an order underwritten by an 
impetus towards issues of justice and fairness under conditions of globalisation.  It is 
here that the new political economy reaches out to political philosophy – a move, we 
suggest, that will continue to define the cutting edge of IPE for the foreseeable future.  
Yet, this is a move which is predicated on an underlying praxiological issue (the wish 
for enhanced global justice) that Cohen’s characterisation of the subject field 
struggles even to recognise, let alone place centre stage.  At most it can see it as a 
largely peripheral practical concern for the half of the transatlantic divide engaged in 
its anti-establishment scholastics, and this is in any case the camp that appears 
destined to lose out in the Methodenstreit Mark Two. 
Nothing in Cohen’s characterisation, however, changes the fact that we are in a 
period of contestation between the grand totalising narratives and theories of 
globalisation on the one hand and the specific history of various actors and sites of 
resistance to this narrative on the other.  Such sites might be activated at the territorial 
level of states, regions or localist forms of organisation, or they might equally be 
activated at the experiential level triggered by identities based on class, gender or 
race.  The new political economy eschews the simplicity of this dichotomy as 
anything but a heuristic device, at the same time as it understands the importance of 
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power – in its structural as well as its relational form (see Strange, 1988) – in forging 
both sides of the ostensible dichotomy into a dialectical relationship.  If it had been 
politically expedient (as both theory and practice) to depoliticise issues of 
redistribution between rich and poor for much of the post-war era, this is no longer the 
case.  Ethical issues surrounding concerns for justice and fairness are increasingly 
front-loaded in North-South discussions and, if these are to be tackled adequately, 
they place an increasingly important demand on a growing role for political 
philosophy in IPE. 
Whilst already talking about issues of justice and fairness in political terms, IPE 
has yet to develop at its core a sophisticated and consistent ethic of justice and 
fairness appropriate to the stretching of economic relations in complex patterns across 
national borders.  Attempts to harness for IPE important foundational work in 
political philosophy on such an ethic are in their infancy, in much the way that 
philosophy’s ability to operate effectively beyond the level of the state is also in its 
infancy.  But from both perspectives an important trend of engagement is in train.  
Even though a misplaced emphasis on discordant transatlanticism in IPE could detract 
from its durability, the serious long-term ethical analysis of globalisation has begun.  
Pre-globalisation assumptions that states steered national economies no longer hold in 
the way they once did.  Normative discussions about the limits to justice and fairness 
(especially questions of socioeconomic distribution) can no longer be conducted 
simply amongst national publics with national boundaries.  A Westphalian 
cartography assuming stable identities and clear lines of authority where important 
society-building public goods can be realised cannot be axiomatically assumed.  It is 
no longer sufficient to focus simply on the just ordering of social relations within a 
given state to ensure that the social bond between citizens and the state is maintained 
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(Devetak and Higgott, 1999).  The stuff of political philosophy remains largely 
unchanged in terms of its basic foundational questions, but the analytical framework 
has begun to shift quite dramatically in order to recognise the need to set such 
questions at the global level. 
To illustrate, recently a number of political philosophers have played a seminal 
role in opening up to a genuinely global perspective discussions about the obligations 
of the rich to the poor.  From a cosmopolitan perspective, and recognising the 
increasingly interconnected contours and leaky boundaries of a globalising world, 
Charles Beitz (1999) has resisted John Rawls’s (1999) more communitarian notions 
that distributive justice between societies divided by Westphalian geography is neither 
as appropriate nor as desirable as distributive justice within them.  Beitz’s argument 
has been taken further by Thomas Pogge (2002) in his work on issues of justice, 
poverty and human rights and the challenge to the automatic entitlement of the 
affluent developed world.  This can now justifiably be said to be the subject matter of 
political philosophy (e.g., Caney, 2005), but it is also incontrovertibly the subject 
matter of the new political economy to which an increasing number of practitioners of 
IPE are orienting their work.  Touching directly on core issues in IPE, for instance, 
Pogge demonstrates how environmental degradation and developing world poverty 
(especially famine) stand in a direct causal relationship with affluent developed world 
lifestyle excess. 
Such issues require attention as a matter of global public priority and they also 
highlight the potential for taking the significant step of blurring the disciplinary 
distinction between political philosophy and IPE.  It would therefore be something to 
regret if Cohen’s views on discordant transatlanticism should solidify into an excuse 
for removing them from centre stage.  If IPE dissolves into methodological 
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competition across his imagined transatlantic divide, then its practitioners are likely to 
forfeit the right to have anything of lasting value to say on the major issues of 
contemporary global political engagement.  However, we are confident that this is not 
the most obvious future for IPE, because the way in which it is currently conceived by 
the larger number of its practitioners does not match Cohen’s characterisation, with 





We are insistent that Professor Cohen’s characterisation of American and British IPE 
is better viewed as a caricature than as a faithful representation of the field.  However, 
there is a sting in the tail to our argument.  We conclude by suggesting that, despite its 
status as caricature, unfortunately the characterisation of transatlantic enmity is still 
likely to have popular appeal here and there within the IPE community.  The reason 
for this is that the depiction of enmity is based at the meta-theoretical level. 
Within the social sciences, debates at the meta-theoretical level – on the 
fundamental questions of what we should study and how we should study it – are 
invariably amongst the most vitriolic.  They are also those which seem most 
susceptible to generating adherents keen to stake a place within a particular camp.  
The search for adherents is not a charge we level at Professor Cohen.  But merely by 
identifying the difference between his two traditions of IPE in such stark terms and by 
invoking methodological competition as the dynamic that keeps them apart he invites 
those of a less mild disposition to try to make a name for themselves by hardening the 
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sense of division.  In such circumstances, it would be much more difficult for the 
peace that he is hoping to engender to actually break out. 
The danger is that scholars within the field might choose to socialise themselves 
in terms of the inherently oppositional categories that Cohen constructs, especially if a 
‘follow my leader’ model of the sociology of knowledge (which can frequently exist) 
holds as close a grip on IPE as he suggests.  It is by fleshing out positions in the 
oppositional logic that one proves oneself to be an adherent within meta-theoretical 
debates, no matter whether those positions originally began life merely as caricatures.  
As such, Cohen’s American and British IPE might not currently exist in the form that 
he identifies but, once named in that way, especially by someone of his rightful 
renown within the subject field, the categories themselves might become attractors, 
drawing analytical work towards them and thus cementing the apparent coherence of 
the positions built upon them.  Such categories consequently have the potential to be 
self-fulfilling, where what results is an increasing number of arguments presented 
against ‘American’ and ‘British’ stereotypes of the field, for little reason than trying 
to score a blow on behalf of the other camp. 
If this does happen then the original oppositional logic threatens to become 
entrenched, thus reducing the breadth of potential scholarship within IPE until the 
subject field comes to resemble the original stereotype.  This would surely be 
something to lament, and given Cohen’s stated desire to find a way past what he 
presents as the transatlantic divide we are convinced that he would agree.  More than 
that, the subsequent entrenchment of his caricature as a real divide would threaten to 
nullify many of the most significant and exciting contemporary developments in IPE, 
because those who are currently reaching out to cognate disciplines such as political 
philosophy would suddenly find that their work was designated as ‘not IPE’ by 
 26 
adherence to Cohen’s categories.  If forced instead to make a choice between the 
American and British stereotypes, many scholars who have contributed so much to 
IPE’s recent dynamism – Cohen himself amongst them, we suggest – could also 
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